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Abstract: In my paper, I consider the holistic 
thought in Theodor W. Adorno’s Husserl-
studies, and the epistemological possibility to 
know the “non-identical”. First, I discuss the 
phenomenological antinomy. This is not only 
the starting point of Adorno’s Husserl-studies, 
but also has his holistic thought in it. Adorno 
pointed out Husserl’s assumptions that our 
consciousness is directly related to objects and 
that our consciousness is always mediately or 
indirectly related to the objects. Second, I dis-
cuss Adorno’s solution of that antinomy. He 
tried to carry out the thorough immanent phi-
losophy with a gestalt theory. And he pointed 
out mediacy in the Husserl’s text and to find 
non-identity between our consciousness and 
objects. Third, I consider the relations between 
the thought of “non-identical” by Adorno and 
his holistic thought. The latter was influenced 
by Hans Cornelius, Adorno’s teacher. So I show 
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Resumen: En mi ponencia considero el pensa-
miento holista presente en los estudios sobre 
Husserl de Theodor W. Adorno y la posibilidad 
epistemológica de conocer la “no identidad”. En 
primer lugar, analizo la antinomia fenomenoló-
gica. No es solo el punto de arranque de los 
estudios sobre Husserl de Adorno, sino que 
también contiene su pensamiento holista. Ador-
no pone de manifiesto las asunciones de Hus-
serl: de que nuestra conciencia está relacionada 
directmente con los objetos y de que nuestra 
conciencia está siempre relacionada de manera 
mediata o indirecta con los objetos. En segundo 
lugar, discuto la solución adorniana a esta anti-
nomia. Su intento consistía en crear una filosof-
ía íntegramente immanentista con ayuda de la 
teoría gestalt. Indica también la mediatez pre-
sente en los textos de Husserl, encontrando la 
no- identidad entre nuestra conciencia y obje-
tos. En tercer lugar, considero la relación entre 
el pensamiento de la “no identidad” de Adorno 
y su pensamiento holista. El autor fue influido 
por Hans Cornelius, el profesor de Adorno. 
Muestro entonces que el pensamiento de Cor-
nelius ha sido de gran importancia para Adorno.   
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I will inquire into the thought of non-identical (Nichtidentisches) as con-
ceived by Theodor W. Adorno and the epistemological possibility of knowing the 
transcendent. Then, I will compare Adorno’s Husserl-studies with Husserl’s 
phenomenology. 
Initially, Adorno submitted a dissertation entitled “Die Transzendenz des 
Dinglichen und Noematischen in Husserls Phänomenologie” (1924) to the Uni-
versity of Frankfurt. This was the starting point of not only his Husserl-studies, 
but also his philosophy itself. During his exile in England and after his return to 
Germany, he continued studying phenomenology. While in exile, he produced 
440 pages of manuscripts1. He published parts of these manuscripts as articles 
entitled “Zur Philosophie Husserls” (1937) and “Husserl and the Problem of Ide-
alism” (1940). Moreover, in Germany, he contributed articles and lectured on 
epistemology with phenomenology2. Finally, based on these manuscripts and 
articles, he published Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Studien Über 
Husserl und die phänomenologische Antinomien (1956). Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy is for Adorno very important. That is to say, Husserl clearly had a profound 
influence on Adorno’s work. And with it, the philosophy of Hans Cornelius is 
very important for Adorno3. Because Adorno wrote and submitted his disserta-
tion under the guidance of Cornelius, and in this sense Cornelius is indispensa-
ble to Adorno’s philosophy. 
 
 
1 Adorno tried to submit a new dissertation entitled "Die phänomenologischen Antinomien. Prolegomena 
zur dialektischen Erkenntnistheorie"; but he did not submitted it (Kramer and Wilcock,1999). 
2  His lecture was entitled Probleme der zeitgenössische Erkenntnistheorie (Husserl) (1951). And he 
wrote articles as follows: "Husserl und Verdinglichung der Logik" (1954), "Kritik der logischen 
Absolutismus" (1954), and "Spezies und Intention" (1956). 
3 After submitting the dissertation, Adorno wrote a postdoctoral thesis (Habilitation) entitled "Der Begriff 
des Unbewussten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre" (1927) under the guidance of Cornelius; howev-
er, he did not submit it. Since then, none of his work was directly influenced by Cornelius. On the other 
hand, he quoted from and referred to the works of Cornelius in Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. 
Therefore, I think that Adorno was heavily under the influence of Cornelius for a long time. Moreover, 
Robin D. Rollinger discussed the relation between Husserl and Cornelius. He pointed out three character-
istics of the thought of Cornelius that differed from that of Husserl. First, Cornelius limited the functions 
of perception to contents given presently in consciousness. Second, he considered every experience as 
perceptible. Third, he searched for the fundamental science with empiricism and causal explanation. 
However, Cornelius himself believed that both insisted on the same thing. However, according to 
Rollinger, the similarities are superficial. Husserl’s phenomenology is superior to the philosophy of Cor-
nelius (Rollinger, 1991). However, Cornelius’s theme was not a causal explanation of mental facts but a 
settlement of synthetic judgment, a priori that was universally applicable (Cornelius, 1916: 49). And it 
was an establishment of a transcendental phenomenology that demonstrated transcendental laws 
through psychological analyses. Husserl identified causal explanation with psychological analysis. In 
contrast, Cornelius distinguished between them. 
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The order of my paper is as follows: first, I will take up the phenomenologi-
cal antinomies as articulated by Adorno. Second, I will discuss Adorno’s ap-
proaches to the solution of those antinomies. He pursued a radical 
immanentism by means of the philosophy of Cornelius and gestalt theory. Fur-
ther, he tried to point out the mediacy in Husserl’s text and to find the non-
identity between consciousness and object. Third, I will introduce the whole as 
an idea (Idee) and consider the relation between the thought of non-identical 
by Adorno and his holistic thinking. This idea is a sort of identity, which forms 
an immediate relation between consciousness and object. Adorno came under 
the influence of Cornelius in the shaping of his holistic viewpoint. Hence, I will 




1. WHAT ARE THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTINOMIES? 
 
1.1. Antinomy of the immanence and transcendence 
Husserl’s phenomenology offered an insight into the relation between con-
sciousness and object or the given (Gegebenes) in pure consciousness as the 
“existential realm of absolute origins” (Husserl, 1913: 107). He said in Ideen: 
“The perception of the things does not present something that is not present as 
though it were a recollection (Erinnerung) or a fancy; it presents and appre-
hends a Self in its bodily presence” (Ibid., 79). The perception of the thing is 
performed by looking directly and immediately at it as “a source of authority 
(Rechtsquelle) for knowledge” (Ibid., 43) or “intuition as primordial dator act” 
(Ibid.) so that “whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form (as it 
were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, 
though only within the limits in which it then presents itself” (Ibid.). Therefore, 
the perceived thing is the self-givenness that appears itself in consciousness, 
and is recognized presently and immediately. 
On the other hand, Husserl defined the thing as “[…] standing over against 
consciousness itself as in principle other, irreal, transcendent” (Ibid., 204) and 
as distinguished from consciousness. After all, the thing is “in principle trans-
cendent entities” (Ibid., 76). Further, between consciousness and the thing is 
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“the most fundamental and pivotal difference between ways of being, that be-
tween consciousness and reality” (Ibid., 77)4. 
In short, on the one hand, Husserl insisted that the object was the self-
givenness in consciousness; at the same time, he insisted that it was distin-
guished from the consciousness. Thus, he holds these two convictions simulta-
neously. Adorno said, “with consciousness whose givens are for Husserl the 
sole source of authority for the knowledge, he already contrasts from the outset 
a transcendent world” (Adorno, 1924: 17), and pointed out “The thesis of a 
transcendent world contradicts the presupposition of consciousness as the ‘exis-
tential realm of origins’” (Ibid., 17). Adorno described those two insistences, 
which contradict each other but hold together, as antinomy5. 
 
1.2. Antinomy of the immediacy and mediacy 
Husserl said in Logische Untersuchungen: “The present, as presentation in 
the strict sense, so interprets the intuitively presentative content, that the ob-
ject appears as itself given with and in this content” (Husserl, 1901B: 83). In 
contrast, Adorno called it into question and asked “[…] what can ‘self-
givenness’ mean when the self-given and thus the immediate is given only ‘with 
and in’ something else, i.e. is given as mediated?” (Adorno, 1956: 159). Fur-
ther, he pointed out “in spite of the object’s pure ‘self-presentation’ and thus 
immediate givenness, it is supposed to be distinct from the ‘act’, meant and 
mediated by it” (Ibid.). Hence, Husserl’s phenomenology “leads to a flagrant 
antinomy” (Ibid.). In other words, Husserl insisted that, on the one hand, an 
object was given in consciousness immediately, and on the other, that it was 
given in consciousness by means of the intuitively presentative content. Here, 





4 Husserl placed object as the self-givenness and, at the same time, discussed the recognition of the 
alter ego (Husserl, 1929: 91f.). However, he was not so naive as to insist on a dualism between con-
sciousness and object (Husserl, 1913: 33f. and 48f.). 
5 Antinomy is not a simple opposition of two. Though one is inconsistent with the other, both exist to-
gether. 
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2. APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTINOMIES 
 
2.1. Radicalization of immanentism 
Adorno tried to dissolve those antinomies, and he attached great im-
portance to the immediate relation between consciousness and object. In this 
manner, Adorno employs the method of Husserl’s phenomenology, so that we 
understand his being influenced by phenomenology. However, this is not the 
only influence. Besides Husserl, Adorno also came under the influence of Cor-
nelius in formulating his thought. He tried to be rid of the distinction between 
consciousness and object and carried out the Radicalization of immanentism6. 
In his dissertation, Adorno defined the thing as a whole combined the present 
given with the past given. We perceive this complex thing in its presence. In 
this case, our perceptual experiences consist of “impression components 
(Eindrucksbestandteile, a partial experience of the class a)” and “representation 
components (Vorstellungsbestandteile, a partial experience of the class α)”. 
Impression components are “presently immediate given objects” (Cornelius, 
1916: 64), the present knowledge of immediate given. This corresponds to the 
immanent perception by Husserl, that is, the immediately perceptual experi-
ence in its presence. On the other hand, representational components are “pre-
sent knowledge of objects which are not present experiences” (Ibid), that is to 
say, it is the mediate given and is perceived the non-present given through the 
present knowledge. This corresponds to the recollection by Husserl (transcend-
ent perception). Thus, the immediately perceptual experience in its presence is 
that “it with a- and α-components necessarily involved gives” (Adorno, 1924: 
45). Husserl could separate immanent perception (impression components) 
from transcendent perception (representation components), and see the former 
as an adequate perception. In contrast, Adorno understood the perception in-
cluding both impression components and representation components. For 
Adorno, the perception in phenomenology seemed to consist only of impression 
components and to abstract representation components. According to Adorno, 
to be given as the complex implies that “the knowledge of previous contents is 
 
 
6  Adorno, in his dissertation, called his own immanentism the “viewpoint of a pure immanence-
philosophy.” (Adorno, 1924: 11) When immanence-philosophy is mentioned, we might remember that of 
Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius, and the critique of them by Husserl. Cornelius had studied under 
Avenarius. In this sense, we can say that the immanence-philosophy of Adorno has succeeded to a tradi-
tion dating as far back as Avenarius. Nevertheless, Adorno’s philosophy has originality as far as he has 
conceived the thought of non-identical. 
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given with and in the present experience” (Ibid., 45), and drawing on the phi-
losophy of Cornelius, it is perceived as “complex” (Cornelius, 1916: 105), which 
includes not only impression components, also representation components. In 
this complex, as soon as impression components are given, representation 
components are also given with the recollection. Cornelius defined the function 
of recollection as follows: “The fact that in present experience knowledge of a 
past experience is given with recollection and that the former represents there-
fore for our knowledge of the latter, I call the symbolic function of the recollec-
tion-experience” (Ibid., 73). Adorno also followed this definition. So the thing 
includes the past contents as what was symbolized and the mediate given, and 
is received as the complex. 
Adorno emphasized the symbolic function of the recollection and under-
stood the thing as the complex, which is given in consciousness. We perceive a 
thing as long as it is given in our consciousness, so that we do not have to dis-
cuss transcendence. Without dealing with the transcendence, as long as the 
thing is the complex, we can perceive it in immanence as the pure conscious-
ness. 
Now, if we perceived things as complex including both the present experi-
ence and the past contents, there is a problem of identity of it. That is to say, 
we should discuss whether the perception of a thing that is given in presence is 
identical to that which was given in the past. 
Husserl distinguished between the perception of a thing in presence and its 
perception in the past. We can see experiences in each moment as the same 
object because consciousness intends and constitutes them as the same. When 
we perceive a desk, for example, we know “the perceived desks” given in each 
moment as the same desk because our consciousness intend and constitute the 
same “desk itself”. So “the thing is the intentional unity, that which we are con-
scious of as one and self-identical within the continuously ordered flow of per-
ceptual patterns as they pass off the one into the other […]” (Husserl, 1913: 
75). 
But Adorno criticized that the identity of the thing by Husserl was assumed 
transcendent existence. As I have pointed out, the thing is the complex includ-
ing both impression components and representation components. So the identi-
ty of the thing is that we recognize the identity of these two components in 
consciousness, without dealing with the transcendent existence. In other words, 
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when we recollect the past contents in the present experience, these contents 
are identical to the object in the present experience, and then we understand 
the identity. Adorno adopted the view by Cornelius and thought that this identi-
ty was based on the recognition of the similarity of those two components in 
consciousness. “The recognition of the similarity of a content with a previous 
given” (Cornelius, 1916: 94) is the act of re-cognition (Wiederkennen). In the 
re-cognition of thing as the complex, there is the re-cognition of type of “the 
first category” and “the second category”. The first category is as follows: each 
simple or complex impression “is recognized with certain previous objects as 
similar, regardless of its position in the relationship with other complex, that is, 
apart from other components in the complex” (Ibid., 105). This means that we 
can re-cognize the past impression by itself without the complex to which it 
belonged and other impression which belonged to this complex. In contrast, the 
second category is as follows: “the present impression is re-cognized as com-
ponents of an ever well-known kind of successive complex” (Ibid., 106). This 
means that we can re-cognize the past impressions as parts of the complex to 
which it belonged, and then they accompany with a temporal succession. The 
perception of the present and past contents as the complex is nothing else “re-
cognition of the second category” (Ibid., 108), so that we can determine these 
contents as the same thing. Moreover, combining with both categories each 
other, in the second category, that is, in its successive complex “the contents, 
which were similar to it [present impression] in the sense of the first category, 
still follow from particular other contents” (Ibid., 106). In the recollection, the 
past and present contents are tied to each other, obeying a regular similarity in 
the consciousness, and they are thereby recognized as the same object. Fur-
thermore, in obedience to this regular similarity, the expectation (Erwartung) 
plays a role in giving us future contents. 
As described above, though we re-cognize the past contents or the future 
contents as similar one in the present experience, the future contents which we 
expect are only to be determined in our consciousness. For example, we sup-
pose that a content given at present occurs as an experience p1 under a condi-
tion x1, and then we expect that an experience p2 occurs under a condition x2. 
Then, the conditions x1 and x2 are based on the given contents and are “an 
only thought” (Ibid., 150) by consciousness, so that the experiences p1 and p2 
can occur as “a thought” experience. Therefore, “the relation between the con-
30 MASAFUMI AOYAGI 
 
 30 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 
 
dition and the caused is [...] only an ideal” (Ibid., 150) relation. And the rela-
tionship of expectation (x-p) establishes in the immanence. Under this relation-
ship, the relation between x and p is determined unambiguously, but we do not 
know which condition does arise from a content, x1 or x2. The condition setting 
and the establishment of expectation depend on the determination of con-
sciousness.  
Therefore, the object that is given in consciousness is the complex, which 
includes both present and not present (past and future) contents; at the same 
time, it is the law that connects both these contents, namely, “law for experi-
ences, constituted only through the relationship of our personal consciousness” 
(Adorno, 1924: 33). An object is the object insofar as it is given in conscious-
ness and “as such it is the relationship of consciousness and certainly in the 
strict sense immanent” (Ibid., 34). However, the regularity of the thing does 
not bring conceptualization or generalization. As the described above, what was 
conditioned each time appears based on the relationship of personal conscious-
ness, and if what was different from this condition and law occurred we have to 
think that another condition and law occurs. These laws are “individual law” 
(Ibid., 46), which is drawn each time in the relationship of personal conscious-
ness. Therefore, Adorno insisted that it is unnecessary to distinguish between 
the immanence and transcendence, and then he projected a complex recogni-
tion in the immanent consciousness. 
There are some remaining problems, nevertheless, with Adorno’s ap-
proaches. First, do not his approaches fall into psychologism? If the distinction 
between the immanence and transcendence were unnecessary and there were 
only the immanence, then would the object be confined to simply psychological 
facts? Husserl might return to an immanent field, that is, a field of the pure 
consciousness through reduction, and ask a question of the transcendence, 
namely, a question of the “transcendence in the immanence” (Husserl, 1913: 
110), so that he would be able to dissolve antinomies. In contrast, Adorno 
might say as follows: The “transcendence in the immanence” is that it is imma-
nence, and hence, this transcendence is just the immanence. We must notice 
the gap in both expressions regarding immanence and transcendence. This is 
the second problem as follows: unlike Husserl, Adorno considered the relation 
between the immanence and transcendence a natural one. In the case of Hus-
serl, in the phenomenological standpoint (phänomenologische Einstellung), he 
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dealt with the theme of the “transcendence in the immanence”. Adorno, on the 
contrary, I think, would not distinguish the phenomenological standpoint from 
the natural standpoint (natürliche Einstellung); he comprehended (or confused) 
both standpoints, so that he re-understood the relation between the conscious-
ness and the object and defined the immanence and transcendence in terms of 
this relation. In short, the theme of the “transcendence in the immanence” by 
Husserl corresponds almost with Adorno’s insistence, that is, the radicalization 
of immanentism and the unnecessity of the distinction between the immanence 
and transcendence. In this sense, someone might criticize such expressions by 
Adorno as resulting from a lack of understanding or a misunderstanding of Hus-
serl’s phenomenology. However, I do not agree. Rather, I think that Adorno 
intentionally changed the relation and meaning between immanence and tran-
scendence. It seemed to Adorno that Husserl’s insistence was formed by ex-
cluding the so-called natural something (Natürliches). Therefore, Adorno 
changed this relation and meaning; he saw Husserl’s Phenomenological Some-
thing as the transcendence, and included the natural something and the phe-
nomenological something in the same transcendence. The theme with this tran-
scendence is just that of the transcendence by Adorno. However, Adorno here-
by faced the difficulty of how to deal with the transcendence that Husserl would 
exclude. Then, he asked whether we can recognize all objects in consciousness, 
or whether there is something apart from something recognized in conscious-
ness, that is, something escaped from epistemological identity.  
I can summarize it as follows: Adorno’s immanence-philosophy accom-
plished the epistemological identity in consciousness, but at the same time, 
something escaped from this identity, namely, non-identical. 
 
2.2. Mediacy of the given 
As a matter of more interest, Adorno tried to change the relation between 
the immanence7 and transcendence by Husserl and to indicate a new relation. 
This is the relation between consciousness (the immanence) and object (the 
transcendence) whose medium is a given8. According to Adorno, the “tran-
 
 
7 According to Husserl, this “immanence” would be expressed as the “transcendence in the immanence”. 
8 At least, Husserl thought about a mediate relation. This is found in the problem of the act of “Appear-
ing” (Erscheinen) and “Something that appears in it” (Erscheinendes). That is to say, in the recognition 
of an object, the object (“Something that appears in it”) is brought to consciousness through “Appear-
ing” (Husserl, 1901A: 347f.). 
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scendence in the immanence” in Husserl’s phenomenology is that the given is 
included in consciousness (the immanence) and is recognized immediately, 
though the given maintains its relation with the object (the transcendence). For 
Adorno, however, since Husserl had excluded transcendence as a natural some-
thing and placed the given as transcendence, the mediacy of the given is ab-
stracted, and “its [the concept of immediacy] dogmatic use must take on the 
task of striking down critical consciousness” (Adorno, 1956: 133) even if imme-
diate recognition was completed in the consciousness. This is what “[…] directly 
and immediately unifies the mediated, and also what confronts the act-
performing subject, with the subject itself” (Ibid., 141). However, Husserl 
maintained that the given exists in relation to something that is different from 
consciousness, namely, the mediacy of the given, even if Husserl insisted on 
anything as “in the immanence” because Husserl also maintained the trans-
cendent character of the given though he insisted on the “transcendence in the 
immanence”. Husserl’s insistence “betrays the discrepancy between what is 
both proper and foreign to the subject” (Ibid., 141), and “this antagonism is 
made evident in Husserl’s identification of the ‘thing itself’ with what is given 
subjectively” (Ibid., 138). If the “transcendence in the immanence” maintained 
the mediacy of the given and has a trace of the transcendence that Adorno 
pointed out, the given would not be without relation to the transcendence. 
Therefore, against the will of Husserl, the problem of the “transcendence in 
immanence” shows us the epistemological non-identity, as well as the mediacy 
of the given. 
From his dissertation to Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, Adorno’s ap-
proaches to the solution of phenomenological antinomies have resulted in the 
epistemological non-identity. In this process, his thought can be described as 
the thought of the non-identical. The non-identical is at the core of the thought 
of Adorno. He has criticized the traditional thought of identity consistently, 
questioning the epistemological relationship between consciousness and object. 
In this regard, he has used the term non-identical. So we consider what is non-
identical in his Negative Dialektik”. 
According to Adorno, the functions that consciousness recognizes an object 
are “to think of something” (Adorno, 1966: 44). And he said, “To think is to 
identify” (Ibid., 17). That is to say, the thinking makes the epistemological con-
sistency between consciousness and object. As long as we recognize the object, 
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we cannot avoid this identification. On the other hand, even if we could make 
the identity in consciousness (or even if we claimed solipsism of conscious-
ness), the object is distinguished from consciousness, as long as it is the ob-
ject. So this distinction is re-produced with the identification. Consciousness 
overcomes the identity, and then identifies further. Nevertheless, something 
remains free from identification in consciousness. Adorno called it non-identical. 
He said as follows:  
 
Dialectically, cognition of non-identical lies also in the fact that this very cognition 
identifies –that it identifies to a greater extent, and in other ways, than identitarian 
thinking. This cognition seeks to say what something is, while identitarian thinking 
says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and what, ac-
cordingly, it is not itself. The more relentlessly our identitarian thinking besets its 
object, the farther will it take us from the identity of the object. (Ibid.,152) 
 
 Thus, when our consciousness or thinking approaches to the object 
through the identification, it would occur what is farther that cannot be identi-
fied, that is to say, the non-identical. And the identity of the object itself is not 
established through the identification by consciousness. In this sense, the iden-
tity of the object is established by object itself, and “the non-identical would be 
the thing’s own identity against its identifications” (Ibid.,164). But it is noted 
that the non-identical is inseparable from the identity and identification. There-
fore, we are conscious of it in the process of identification. Hence, we cannot 
state positively “there is a ‘non-identity,’” but, rather negatively, that “it is not 
identified”. He had not yet discussed the non-identical in earnest in his disserta-
tion, whereas in his Habilitation is found a sign of non-identical. His Habilitation 
is treated the problem of unconsciousness. For him unconsciousness should not 
be hypostatized as what is unconscious, but must be considered as that it is not 
consciousness. Here it contains the possibility of difference between conscious-
ness and object. 
 
 
3. HOLISTIC IDEA (IDEE) IN ADORNO’S THOUGHT 
 
3.1. Adorno’s holistic thinking 
There exists a difference between the views of Adorno and Husserl because 
of the difference in their philosophical approaches. On the one hand, Husserl 
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defined phenomenology as the general science (philosophia prima) and placed 
it as a foundation of the sciences. He therefore attached great importance to 
the method as “foundation” (Fundierung). When he sought a foundational or 
original something, he determined the components analytically and divided 
them rigorously. The analytical way is a feature in Husserl’s phenomenology. 
For example, when he treated the perception about a thing, he at first distin-
guishes among the present contents that are experienced, the past contents 
that are recollected, and the future contents that are expected. And then he 
connects with these contents as one thing. On the other hand, Adorno criticized 
Husserl’s viewpoint as an atomistic theory9 or elementalism, and he adopted a 
holistic thinking. First, Adorno conceived of things as a whole. In his disserta-
tion, for example, he saw an object as the complex and law. In his Zur 
Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, moreover, he found not only immediacy but 
also mediacy in the phenomenology and pursued an image (Bild) of the whole 
that included both. In short, Adorno’s holistic thinking is one of the characteris-
tics of his thought, that is to say, he at first conceived a whole something and 
then grasped the cohesion of its parts. 
The holistic thinking by Adorno was influenced by the philosophy of Cor-
nelius. Above mentioned, for example, Adorno wrote his dissertation referring 
to Cornelius’s works and he called objects the complex and law that Cornelius 
had used in his Transcendentale Systematik. Now, Cornelius and Adorno adopt-
ed the views of the gestalt theory. So Adorno’s thinking includes some influence 
from the gestalt theory. However, he did not just adopt this gestalt theory. Ac-
cording to him, “[…] it [gestalt theory] serves to lay an ideological smokescreen 
for divided reality […]” (Adorno, 1956:164) and makes light of the elements 
included in a whole, the cohesion of these elements, as well as their opposition 
to one another. Therefore, the gestalt theory “[…] makes epistemology neglect, 
[…] any insight into the reciprocal effects between the two moments and their 
mutual dependence” (Ibid.). In this way, the gestalt theory “[…] must immedi-
ately equate the given as something elementary with the whole and hence 
makes as little room for mediation as does phenomenology” (Ibid.); it then hy-
postatizes the whole, identifies it thoroughly and violently, and abstracts ele-
 
 
9 Besides it, Adorno used “mosaic psychology” in a similar way. It is a term used originally by William 
James to criticize Wilhelm M. Wundt. In the case of Adorno, this word meant the character of 
elementalism of the Husserl’s phenomenology (Adorno, 1924: 32, 73 and Adorno ,1956: 164). 
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ments included in a whole and escaped from the identity. Like these elements, 
Adorno pointed out, “the very concept of the elementary is already based on 
division. This is the moment of untruth in gestalt theory” (Ibid.).  
In brief, on the one hand, Adorno criticized the characteristic elementalism 
in Husserl’s phenomenology; on the other, he did not necessarily adopt the 
thought of holism as expounded in the gestalt theory (or the philosophy of Cor-
nelius). The situation that tries to find something included in the whole or es-
caped from it without hypostatizing it leads to the development of the thought 
of non-identical by Adorno, where he made us aware of a something escaped 
from identity. 
However, did Adorno earnestly reject the identity and insist on difference or 
non-identity exclusively? Even if his insistence was able to destroy the existing 
thought of identity and its system, could we not call it his positive insistence? 
Or, did he only confute his enemies while not advocating his own opinion? To 
answer these questions, I can assume as follows: Adorno criticized the identity 
and made us aware of the non-identical; as a result he insisted on a sort of 
whole, and furthermore, a particular sort of identity (even if he did not assert 
this positively). This is the whole as idea (Idee)10.  
 
3.2. The whole as idea (Idee) 
According to Adorno, an object that is given in consciousness, that is, “the 
[…] immediate is always, as a concept, mediated […]” (Adorno, 1956:15-16). 
The given is recognized as a concept included in mediate relation to the tran-
scendence. Immediacy of the concept is the immediacy including mediacy. Ad-
ditionally, the identity of the concept is also the identity that includes the medi-
ate relation and the non-identity. Husserl would seek, from the phenomenologi-
cal standpoint, the immediacy that does not include the mediation, and the 
identity that does not include the non-identity. Even if the immediacy and iden-
tity include mediate relation and the non-identity, he would rigorously divide 
and distinguish them. However, such immediacy and identity conceal mediacy 
and non-identity, though they include them. According to Adorno, self-identical 
concepts “point beyond themselves” (Ibid.,47) or they show non-identity, and 
 
 
10 We have to pay attention to the fact that this concept of the whole is different from that of “totality” 
by Georg W. Hegel. We can say that the totality is absolute something. Adorno also rejected it. 
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this is accomplished by “[…] mindfulness of the suffering that sedimented itself 
in concepts […]” (Ibid.). The immediate and identical concepts reveal the medi-
ate relation and non-identity concealed in immediacy and identity. Then, he 
called it “the moment of the ruin” (Ibid.), in other words, “the idea of philo-
sophical critique” (Ibid.). The philosophy as a critique shows non-identical mo-
ments in self-identical concepts and the Illusoriness (Scheinbarkeit) of these 
concepts. These concepts are called self-identical ones, though they are identi-
ties including non-identities. However, that which is self-identical reveals that it 
is non-identical, and shows that it is an Illusion (Schein). Adorno considered the 
whole to be the concepts that showed Illusoriness in the process of such a 
change, and he called it an idea (Idee). 
According to Adorno, with the collapse of such concepts, “[…] concepts 
leave off and yet persist (innehalten) and become images” (Ibid.). Recognition 
of images implies the receiving of a copy of the object and recognizing the ob-
ject through the mediation of the images. This might be, so to speak, a mediate 
recognition where object has the advantage over subject. However, he did not 
blindly introduce this mediate recognition. According to him, “Husserl convinc-
ingly polemicizes against the image and sign theories of cognition” (Ibid.,141), 
which are typical of recognition of images and “[…] that polemic could also be 
turned against the sublimated idea that cognition is an image of its object 
through resemblance or adaequatio” (Ibid.). In keeping with this idea of philo-
sophical critique, we have shown the mediate relation and the non-identity in 
contrast to the immediacy and identity by Husserl, and now we must criticize 
the mediate recognition and further thoroughly develop the idea of the philo-
sophical critique itself. This is a self-critique of the philosophy, and it is accom-
plished in terms of a new idea. In other words, “only with the idea of an image-
less truth would philosophy retrieve the prohibition of images” (Ibid.)11. The 
idea of an imageless truth is that it refuses hypostatization of the mediate 
recognition and it forbids the hypostatization of the images while looking for the 
immediate recognition about the object12. Adorno discussed the epistemological 
 
 
11 The expression “the prohibition of images (Bilderverbot)” originally comes from Mose’s Ten Com-
mandments. However, Adorno used it here within the scope of the problem of epistemology. 
12 That immediacy includes mediation is common to both the concept that I first described and the idea 
of an imageless truth. Yet, the latter is a more highly advanced immediacy, and it can comprehend the 
former. 
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relation between consciousness and object in terms of this holistic idea, that is, 
the idea of an imageless truth. 
However, we must pay attention to the fact that an idea, Adorno used, is 
not at all an original something or an absolute something. On the one hand, the 
idea of the philosophical critique is the whole where we could find the mediate 
relation and non-identity in immediacy and identity. On the other hand, the 
idea of an imageless truth is the whole where we could find the immediate rela-
tion between consciousness and object, and the identity in the recognition that 
includes mediate recognition and non-identity. The two ideas are common inso-
far as they are holistic and comprehensive. However, as the critique is devel-
oped thoroughly, both something included in the whole and this whole itself 
change. In short, these ideas are not absolute, and change with the change of 
something in them13. Further, Adorno avoided a positive assertion without hy-
postatizing ideas and wrote about these ideas by criticizing the identity included 
in them. Thus, he criticized the thought of identity while holding the whole as 
an idea; he pointed out the thought of the non-identical and revealed a particu-





I have taken up phenomenological antinomies and, through the solution of 
those antinomies, clarified the differences between Adorno and Husserl. We 
understood that Adorno presented the thought of non-identical in his Husserl-
studies. His relation with Husserl’s phenomenology is important for the for-
mation of his thought. In addition, I have pointed out Adorno’s holistic thinking 
under the influence of Cornelius’ philosophy. Therefore, we cannot overlook the 
role of Cornelius who affected the thought of Adorno and was connected with 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Furthermore, I have presented the significance of a 
particular sort of identity in the thought of Adorno, that is, the whole as an 
idea. Therefore, I would like to define the thought of Adorno as not only that of 
non-identical but also that of identity with special meaning. 
 
 
13 Therefore, the idea of an imageless truth can be replaced by another idea with a developed critique. 
For example, “constellation (Konstellation)”, an expression Adorno used, demonstrates the characteristic 
of this idea plainly. 
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